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"The policy of the Government of the United States 
is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent 
safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial 
and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed 
to friendly Powers by treaty and international law. and 
safeguard for the world the principle of equal and im-
partial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire ." 
-Honorable John Hay, Secretary o£ State, 1900. 
"It therefore will be necessary for the United States 
to decide whether it will actively move to compel a sat-
isfactory solution. or will permit American interests to 
continue to drift on the current of events; whether it will 
formulate its own policy, or have one thrust upon it; 
\\·hether it will lead or follow. That the United States 
must have an Asiatic policy cannot be doubtful." 
-Thomas F. Millard. 
BULLETIN NO. 8 
June, 1928 
AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR 
FAIR PLAY IN CHINA 
HISTORICAL OUTLINE 
1784-First American ship in Canton Harbor. 
1844-First treaty between the United States and China. Americans to trade at five new 
ports; definite statement of principle of extraterritoriality; 5% tariff. 
1859-Treaty between the United States and China, subsequent to treaty of Tientsin be-
tween China and France and Great Britain. Eight new ports opened; reduction of 
tariff; toleration of Christianity; establishment of American Ministry at Peking. 
1863-Municipal Council at Shanghai elected by Americans and British. 
1867-Chinese Mission to foreign countries; Burlingame, American Minister, a member. 
1868-First American Immigration Law. 
1880--Limitation of Chinese immigration, and American undertaking to refrain from 
opium traffic. 
1883-Treaty of Friendship and Commercl' with Korea. 
1885-Excess portion of Taiping Indemnity remitted. 
1894-Service of the United States to Japan and China, in attempting to avert war between 
them, and as custodian of their intl."rests during the war. 
1899-The Open Door Policy. 
1900--The Boxer Uprising. Terms of the protocol of 1901 applying to the United States: 
Permission to maintain military force in Peking Legation; to contribute to joint 
guard at Tientsin, and along Peking-Tientsin Railway; $25,000,000 indemnity. 
1903-Commcrcial treaty between United States and China, providing for: Raising of 
Chinese import and export tariffs to an effective 5%; abolition of likin. 
1904-Request of United States that Russia and Japan respect Chinese neutrality during 
the war. 
1905-Agreement on the part of the United States to a Japanese protectorate for Korea. 
Mediation of United States between Japan and Russia, bringing war to close. 
1908-Remission of $11,000,000 of Boxer Indemnity, the amount over actual loss. 
1909-Rejection by Russia and· Japan of Secretary Knox's proposal to neutralize the 
Manchurian railways. 
1911-The Chinese Revolution. No formal support from United States; assistance of 
individual Americans-Homer Lea, Paul Linebarger, etc.; tradition of Admiral 
Mark Bristol's friendliness and tact towards revolutionary leaders. 
1913-Recognition by United States of Chines<.' Republic. 
1915-United States' protest to Japan and China oYer the "Twenty-one Demands." 
1917-The Lansing-Tshii Agreement, recognizi11g Japan's "special interests" in China. 
United States' successful attempt to enroll China in the war against Germany. 
1918-Efforts of United States to secure the restoration of Shantung to China at the Ver-
sailles Conference, unsuccessful. 
1920--Conference of International Consortorium of Bankers, headed by American group. 
Negative result, due to exclusion of Chinese bankers from their plans. 
1921-22-Washington Disarmament Conference. 
1924-Remission of final portion of Boxer Indemnity to China.* 
1925-Tariff Conference. 
1926-Report from Extraterritoriality Commission. 
1927-Porter Resolution passed by Congress, recommending revision of unilateral treaties. 
Statement of independent American policy by Secretary Kellogg. Proposal by 
Secretary Kellogg to contending Chinese factions to eliminate Shanghai from the 
war area. rejected. Presentation of identic notes to Eugene Chen by the five major 
powers, demanding reparations for the violence and destruction at Nanking. 
1928-Failure of Morgan project to loan $30,000,000 to the South Manchurian Railway. 
United States' support of Japanese stand to retain central customs administration 
at Peking, as tending to emphasize unity of China. Temporary status of marines 
in China altered March 1st to permanent status. Adjustment between Nanking 
Government and United States of demands for reparation following the Nanking 
trouble last year. 
*This sum. about $3 .000,000, is secured by the maritime customs. It Is being used, at our 
: .. commendation, for educational purposes, through the China Foundation for the Promotion of 
fo:ducation and Culture. This Foundation maintains the China Institute In New York, supports 
the Metropolitan Library at Peking, and distributes prizes for scientific achievements, and grants 
to educational institutions In China. 
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There are two sources from which one may acquire a conception as to the nature of 
the policy of this country towards China: State documents, and the course of event . 
The purpose of this report is to examine both ources, to note consistencies and incon-
sistencies, and in the light of what has happened. to summarize the pres·ent American 
policy. 
NATURE OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN CHINA 
The nature of the policy of the United States towards China has been 
logically determined by the character of our interests in China. These have 
been confined almost entirely to trade and cultural actiYities. During the 19th 
century, while European and Japanese colonial expansion was progressing at 
so rapid a rate in China, the United States was occupied with the vast task 
of expansion on the North American continent. If we had been an established 
nation at that time, perhaps we, too, would have acquired a vast indignation 
at the murder of missionaries and soothed ourselves with territorial grants. 
As it is, the United States has no leased territories. possessions, nor conces-
sions in China. Our total investment, missionary and commercial. amounts to 
a little more than half of our trade with China during 1926. which totaled 
$253.363,129. 
Because we have not a lienated Chinese territory, we have been spared 
bloodshed and the reputation of foreign aggressor, which has applied to every 
other major power represented in China. We have relied instead upon friend-
ship and persuasion, and this course has created for our country much genuine 
good-will among the Chinese. Our material investment being smaller, \Ve 
have been more free to pursue a progressive and liberal course. And·yet, be-
cause we are in a sense a graft onto the original stock of rooted foreign inter-
ests in China, we must ever seek to conciliate Japan in the north, and England 
and France in central and south China. These powers wi ll modify our policy 
as long as they maintain their holdings in China. 
INTERCOURSE BETWEEN THE UNITE D STATES AND CHINA 
Long before diplomatic relations were established between the United 
States and China, trade flourished between Canton and the New England 
ports. By 1810 thirty-seven American ships were anchored in Canton harbor. 
Our first treaties with China (1844 and 1859) followed up the advantages 
won by Great Britain ·and France in their wars with China. By invoking 
the most-favored-nation clause, we were enabled to trade on equal terms 
\Yith Europeans at all the treaty ports, although we had fought no battles 
and made no enemies. Our first minister was appointed to Peking by the 
terms of the treaty of 1859. 
Our early contacts with China had been determined by trade expediency. 
Closer associations, the development of California, and the expansion of trade, 
made these more frequent and complex. The "friendship policy" began to 
emerge. In 1868 the first American 1mmigration Act was passed, granting 
to Chinese the right of citizenship and free residence in the United States. 
and affirming "the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home 
and allegiance and also the mutual advantage of free immigration and emi-
gration." In 1880 \Ye agreed not to engage in the opium trade. A few years 
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later, Congress returned to China almost half of the Taiping indemnity of 
::00.000 taels, the amount ab(l\·e actual loss sustained hy .\merican mterest. 
during the Taiping Rebel lion. 
The war between Japan and China (1894-95) accelerated the impending 
break-up of China. Formosa was ceded to Japan. Russia demanded the 
lease of Darien and Port Arth ur. Kwanchowwan was leased to France, and 
Great Britain demanded the lease of Kowloon and \tVei-hai-wei. The future 
was not promisinig either for Chinese independence or American trade. Ac-
cordingly John Hay proposed his famous "Open Door" policy, which ·was 
accepted by all of the powers . Its three stipulations were: 
(1 ) Treaty ports or vested interests shall be free from all in terference on the part 
of the power within whose "sphere of influence" such ports or interests are located. 
(2) The Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed 
or shipped to all such ports as are within said " sphere of interest," and the duties shall 
be collected by· the Chinese Government. 
(3) Discriminatory dues and charges shall not be levied against merchandise belong-
ing to citizens or subjects of powers other than the power dominating said "sphere" . 
T his policy was designed to regul ate the administrations of t he powers 
in t heir severa l "spheres" of infl uence. It protect ed t hem from each other, 
and pr evented th e partiti on of China. A nd it permitted A m erican trade to 
develop in a coun try w here we had no territorial foo thold . 
In 1901, d uring the proceedings which fo llowed the Boxer Uprising, 
t he U nited Sta tes secured from the powers involved fo rmal agreement to 
the p rinciple of China's territorial and administra tive sovereignty. In 1908 
Congre~s remi tted t o China nearly half of our $25,000,000 share of the Boxer 
I nd emnity, or t he amount in excess of our losses. A nd when in 1915 J apan 
presented her famous "Twenty-one Deman ds," we protes ted again st certain 
features-to be explici t , against t hose w hich consti t uted an invasion of Great 
Britain 's sphere of influ ence, and t hose w hi ch r equired Japanese supervision 
of a large share of China's domestic administration.* 
I n 1917, China at the instigation of the U nited States, severed r elations 
with Germany, and later declared war. O ur Governmen t beli eved t hat as an 
ally at the Peace Conference, Chi na could more effectively ask fo r the restor-
ation of S hantung. O ur attempt to secure the return of Shantung to China at 
Versaill es was unsuccessful, cl ue to t he secret treaties which J apan had made 
with Great Britain and France in which t hey agreed to uphold her claims 
to Shantung. The Chinese delegates refused to sign the treaty. 
In 1921 came the Washington Conference, where, at t he insistence of 
the British and American delegates, the relations of the foreign {_)Owers with 
*The original "Demands" includ<>d: (1) Transfer of German privileges in Shantung to Japan and 
exclusiw• rights in Shantung. (2) Absolute freedom of residence and occupation for Japanese in 
South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia; Japanese subjects to b<> permitted to open mines in this 
rPgion; JapanesE' GovE>rnmf'nt consent to be obtained on loans from a third Power for building 
railway,; in this r~gion; political, financial, and military acl\'isers in this region to be Japanese; 
Jpast>s of Port Arthur, Dalny, the South Manchurian Railway, and the Antung-Mukden Railway 
to b<> extended to 99 years. (3) The Hanyehping Company (in the Yangtse valley) to be a joint 
concern of Japan and China; no other mines in the neighborhood of those owned by said Com-
pany to be worked by persons outside of the Company w ithout its consent, and no undertaking 
directly or indir<>ctly affecting its interests to be carried out without its consent. (4) The Chinese 
Go,·ernment not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbor or bay or island along the coast of 
China. (5) The Chinese Government to employ Japanese advisers in political, financial, and m ili-
tary affairs; Chinese and .Japanese to administer jointly police departments in important places; 
China to purchas<' a fixecl amount of munitions from Japan; Japanese approval required on 
foreign loanH for the dPvelopment of Fukien province. 
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China were reconsidered. Upon the treaties there drawn up are based the 
present formal relations between China and the powers. 
Out of the history of our intercourse with China have emerged three tra-
ditions: Pursuit of trade; defense of China's interests; and co-operation with 
the other powers. By these principles our diplomatic course ha been guided; 
and because they sometimes conflict rather badly, the history of our relations 
with China is not the uninterrupted stream of benefits con~erred and received 
that some have conceived it to be. 
In the interests of trade, our nationals exist in China on the same basis 
as other foreigners, whereby they receive privileges which we would never 
freely grant to foreigners in our country. American goods may enter China 
at rates fr0m Sj'r to 107c. whereas Chinese goods entering our country must 
be taxed at rates varying from 30% to 90%. The effects of our first friendly 
immigration treaty were arbitrarily annulled by exclusion in 1904, and the 
way in which the law has been applied at ports of entry has been most un-
fortunate.* Our attempts to prevent the war with Japan in 1894, and to spare 
invasion of Chinese territory in 190+. were unsuccessful. \Ye agreed to sixteen 
0f the twenty-one demands. the date of whose acceptance the Chinese obsen ·e 
with national mourning. Our proposal that Chinese territorial and admin-
istrative sovereignty be respected is violated by the treaties in force, and 
by the unauthorized measures which the powers, including the United 
States, have chosen to consider necessary. 
What good has our policy brought China? We have kept bad fro m 
going to worse. We have not kept money that did not belong to us. And 
we have made an effort to bring about moderate reforms in the general 
fore ig n policy of the powers. 
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 
A t the Washington Conference summoned by Presiden Harding in 
1921, various treat ies were drawn up between the nine powers represented, 
towards the adoption of "a policy designed to stabil ize conditions in the Far 
East, to safegua rd t he r ig hts and interests of China, and to promote inter-
course between China and the other powers on the basis of equality of oppor-
tunity." The main agreements outlined in the treaties were: 
(1) Respect of China 's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative 
integrity. 
(2) China to receive the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to develop and 
maintain for herself an effective and stable government. 
(3) Armed forces maintained by the powers in China without treaty sanction were 
to be withdrawn whenever China should assure the protection of the lives and property of 
foreigners in China. • 
( 4) A Tariff Commission representing those countries participating in the t r eaties, 
and others trading with China on the old treaty basis, was to meet in conference fo r the 
consideration of the best means of effecting revisions in the scale of tariff duties, and of 
*By the Act of 1924, American citizens of Chinese race may not even bring their wives to 
this country from China. Because there are fewer Chinese women than men in this country, 
many thousands of Amer ican citizens must either give up their residence here, or remain single. 
A bill to remedy this situation, sponsored by Congressman Dyer, has been pending before Con-
gress for two years. 
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reforming the administration of the customs with a view to granting China ultimate 
tariff autonomy. 
(5) Another Commission similarly formed, was to be appointed for the investiga-
tion of China's claims that Extraterritoriality sh9uld be abolished. 
(6) Foreign postal agencies were to be replaced by a Chinese system. 
(7) Japan was to relinquish her political control of Shantung, and to give the 
Chinese an opportunity to redeem the Shantung railway. 
(8) Great Britain was to restore \Vei-hai-wei to China. (The lease expired in 1923.) 
The psychological effect of the vVashington Conference Treaties was 
Yery great, but the first force of their promises was weakened by the three 
years' delay in ratifying them. occasioned by the insistence of the French 
Government that payment still due on her share of the Boxer Indemnity be 
in gold francs of the standard of 1901. 
The Tariff Conference met in the fall of 1925. Its sessions were sus-
pended after several months, due to unsettled conditions in north China, 
which, however, were not so serious as to prevent the Chinese Governmnt 
from paying the costs of the Conference. As a result of the deliberations, 
tariff autonomy was deferred for three years (until January, 1929); the cus-
toms rates in the meantime were adjusted to an effective 5% with surtaxes 
from Zy;;% to 5% on luxuries; while the eventual going into effect of the 
Chinese national tariff law was to be dependent upon the abolition of likin. 
In 1926, the Extraterritoriality Commission presented its report, in 
which it approved relinquishment of extraterritorial privileges after the 
Chinese judicial and prison systems should have been modernized· to the 
degree deemed necessary by the Commission. It advocated the application 
of Chinese laws wherever possible in consular courts, payment of authorized 
Chinese taxes by foreigners, reforms in the administration of foreign courts, 
etc. It was not empowered to put into effect any of its recommendations. 
The foreign postal agencies were replaced by a Chmese system. 
Japan relinquished her political hold on Shantung. She however retained 
all the German mines and property rights she had seized during the war. 
W ei-hai-wei has not yet been restored by the British, on the ground 
that a responsible recipient has not yet been found. The lease expired five 
years ago. 
How effective has our "friendship policy" been since 1925. when the 
Conference Treaties were ratified? 
The Chinese have been collecting the duties and ·surtaxes approved by 
the Customs Conference. 
The British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang were turned over early 
in 1927 to joint Chinese and British control, not as a result of the dignified 
grinding of Conference wheels, but because excited Chinese crowds demanded 
it. and the British thought best not to "shoot their customers" but to pacify 
them. 
' 
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The Shanghai Municipal Council, supposedly at the insistence of the 
hom.e governments, grant the Chinese three places on the main board, and 
six places on sub-committees, and admit the Chinese to the public parks 
at last. 
The Porter Resolution, requesting that new treaties be drawn up between 
the United States and China, to effect a revision of the unilateral status exist-
ing, ~as passed in Congress over a year ago, and has been gathering dust 
ever smce. 
As for the guarantee of China's "territorial and administrative sov-
ereignty," and the promises to "provide the fullest and most unembarrassed 
opportunity to establish," etc., and to withdraw unauthorized troops upon 
assurance that foreigners will be protected-these pledges have been violated 
whenever the powers have conceived China's interests as opposed to their 
0\Vl1. 
OUR PRESENT POLICY 
The main points of our prese nt Chin ese poli cy as summed up by Dr. 
Stanley Hornbeck, Director of the Far Eastern Division of the State Depart-
ment, are: 
(1) Assurance of equality of opportunity. 
(2) Respect for China's sovereignty. 
(3) Non-interference in China's domestic affairs. 
(4) Non-aggression. 
(5) Insistence that China perform the obligations of a sovereign state in protection 
of foreign citizens. 
(6) Co-operation with foreign powers. 
He adds: " It should be obvious, however, that there may at any time arise a situa-
.tion in which it will not be possible to act in conformity with all of the implications 
of each and all of these principles in every respect at one and the same time." And with 
regard to the pledge of co-operation he says: "The theory of the co-operative policy 
does not require that in whatsoever direction one or more powers may wish to proceed 
the others must go; and the express commitments with regard to co-operation are com-
mitments individually and collectively to refrain from aggression. The principle of inde-
pendent action may be applied properly where such unanimity has not been or cannot 
be achieved, or where the issue is one in which rights and interests peculiar to one or 
several powers only are involved." 
Inasmuch as Japan has just been illustrating in Shantung, with the ap-
proval of all the powers, that when "rights and interests peculiar to one 
power are involved" that power is not bound to "refrain from aggression," 
even this last principle is not binding. 
How do we stand on the question of treaty revision? On January 27th, 
1927, Secretary Kellogg made this statement: 
"The Government of the United States is ready now to continue the negotiations 
on the entire subject of the tariff and extraterritorialiy, or to take up negotiations on 
behalf of the United States alone. The only question is with whom it shall negotiate. 
If China can agree upon the appointment of delegates representing the authorities or the 
people of the country, we are prepared to negotiate such a treaty. However, existing 
treaties which were ratified by the Senate cannot be abrogated by the President, but must 
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be superseded by new treaties negotiated by somebody representing China." 
Unfortunately this was only a statement to the press. If it had also 
been handed to the Chinese minister, it would have indicated more clearly our 
serious intention to negotiate. Both northern and southern factions had acted 
through Dr. Sze on occasion, and such responsible students of Oriental pol-
itics as Grover Clark of the Peking Leader, the Right Reverend Alfred A. 
Gilman of Wuchang, China, Congressman Stephen Porter and Thomas Mil-
lard believed negottation to be possible. A nation that plunges so hopefully 
into disarmament conferences should not be afraid to "lose face" in China. 
Our Government should make every effort to utilize the present visit of 
the Nationalist Delegation to \Vashington as a means toward effecting re-
vision of our treaties with China. The ationalist Government has been for 
more than a year the most effective and far-reaching administrative body in 
China. We have recognized it sufficiently to negotiate with it towards a 
settlement of the losses suffered by Americans at Nanking last year. If a 
government is responsible enough to pay an indemnity, it is responsible 
enough to be recognized. In all probability the 1 ationalists will succeed 
in breaking up the northern dictatorship. Their next great problem will 
be to maintain control over the factions within their own ranks. If the United 
States recognizes the Nanking administration as the legal government of 
China, their task of maintaining the solidarity of their party will be much 
simpler. 
THE PRESENT SITUATION 
A recent dispatch from Washington says that when the Nationalist 
Government controls China south of the Great Wall the United States Gov-
ernment 
(1) Will agree to recognize it, provided that foreign treaties will be respected ·until 
changed by orderly process. 
(2) Troops and gunboats in the interior will be withdrawn when a stable, central 
government demonstrates its ability to protect American property interests and American 
citizens. 
(4) This Government is willing to begin negotiations immediately upon recognition. 
(5) Active American support is promised against any move to divide China into 
foreign spheres of influence, or to take possession of Chinese territory. 
One would like to believe that this policy will be put into effect as it 
stands, and as simple people read it, but there is no reason to believe that it 
will be any less subject to de-vitalization than were the Washington Con-
ference Treaties. Only a few months ago a few of the larger American firms 
in Shanghai formed a committee to raise a fund of $1,000,000 for publicity in 
favor of intervention in China. Foreigners abroad do not want to pay higher 
tariffs, nor are they willing, the majority of them, to relinquish a system 
whereby they enjoy privileges they could not have at home. 
All of the powers haYe agreed that Japan has special privileges in 
Manc huria and eastern :.rongolia. which constitute at least a "foreign 
sphere of influence," if not actual alienation of Chinese territory. The gen-
eral opinion is that a separate state will be made out of Manchuria, and that 
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Chang Tso-lin will be retained as gO\·ernor, under a virtual Japanese protec-
torate. O r if Chang Tso-lin proves too refractory, the young l\fanchu Em-
peror may be restored to the throne of his hereditary kingdom. The 15,000,-
000 Chinese in Manchuria are not at all reconciled to the domination of the 
125,000 odd Japanese who have settled there. Eventually the United State3 
must take sides, or else back out of 'Number 5 as gracefu lJ y as we can.* 
~ If the outlawry of war treaties now pending between the United States, 
Japan, and the European powers go into effect, and no definite safeguard be 
taken of Chinese interests, Japan can carve out a kingdom for herself com-
prising not . on ly Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, but Shantung and. Chihli. 
and we can offer only a verbal protest. Great Britain can take Tibet-if she 
wishes. A n incontrovertible recognition of Chinese sovereignty throughout 
Chinese territory is the only way in which the "Open Door Policy" can be 
preserved if these join t agreements to refrain from offensive warfare be rati-
fied, and taken seriously. 
And in the meantime Europe watches us apprehensively, and, we may 
be assured, does not confine herself to watching. Why? Because, to quote 
Lloyd George: 
"If the Chinese get it in their heads that some nations are their friends and others 
their enemies, the trade will be captured by those who are believed Ito be friends." 
This is why "Senator Borah's suggestion that the State Department mediate between 
Japan and China during the present crisis has not created a favorable reaction among 
European governments with Asiatic interests. America's Oriental influence is as great 
as is consistent with the welfare of other Occidental nations." (From the Geneva cor-
respondent to the N. Y. Herald-Tribune, 5/14/28.) 
Has the United States a Chinese policy? Not if by policy is meant a 
consis tent and effective course of action. We have a few traditions: The de-
velopment of trade, reluctance to commit aggressions, the desire to "play 
safe," the desire to befriend when this is not too hazardous. We have com-
mitted ourselves on paper to the doing of courageous and honorable things: 
T o the fulfillment of treaties, to the renunciation of unjust privileges, to th e 
recognition that human rights are the same in a ll countries, and at that point 
ou r diplomatic clock ran down. One of two things will happen. Either our 
democracy will prove its effectiveness and the desire of the people to express 
their genuine friendliness through these pledges wi ll be fe lt; or we shall con-
tinue to make amiable promises, and wait until the Chinese are able to force 
us to put them into effect. 
COMMITTEE ON PUBLICATIONS. 
•As a matter of fact, the United States has for many years recognized Japan's "peculiar 
interest" in Manchuria. During his administration President Roosevelt expressed this very def-
init ely: "The vita l interest of the United States is to keep Japan out of our country, ancl at the 
same time to preserve the good will of Japan. The vital interest of the Japanese, on the other 
hand. is in Manchuria and Korea. It is therefore peculiarly our interest not to tal<e any steps as 
r egards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to f eel, with or without r eason, that we 
are hostile to them, or a menace in however slight a deg1·ee to their interests." 
Last year, our Government once more sanctioned Japanese domination in Manchuria and 
Mongolia by acquiescing to the Tanaka "positive" policy. In November, It even appeared that 
the Japanese South Manchurian Railway was to receive a $30,000,000 Joan from the firm of J.P. 
Morgan and Company. Resolute public opposition to the loan, both in China and this countr y , 
preYented its ultimate approval by the State Department. 
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THE TSINANFU INCIDENT 
During the last thirty years, Shantung Province has been the scene of foreign and 
Chinese invasions, and the subject of much public and diplomatic discussion. 
In 1898 Germany demanded from China as reparation for the murder of two mis-
sionaries, the district in Shantung known as Kiaochow, which included the port of Tsing-
tao, an ideal site for a naval base. She also acquired the right to build a railway to 
Tsinanfu, the capital, 225 miles inland, to a given strip of land on either side of the rail-
way, and to coal and salt mines as well as certain telegraph and cable privileges. In 
1914, when Japan entered the war, she saw an excellent opportunity to get rid of a 
dangerous rival and seized the German interests in Shantung on the pretext that she was 
acting only as temporary guardian and would turn them 0\'er to China. She extended 
her control not only over the German interests, but over Tsinanfu and Chinese towns 
along the railroad. The German property she had appropriated she sold to Japanese. 
Section I of the "Twenty-one Demands" gave Japan exclusive control of Shantung. 
\\'hen, at the vVashington Conference, she relinquished her political privileges in Shan-
tung, he retained the German mines and properties which she had confiscated. The 
Chinese were given permission to redeem the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad, but not by 
immediate payment in full as they proposed at the time. Instead, Japan required a grad-
ual redemption through a period of from five to fifteen years, thus retaining a mortgage 
on the road* 
Geographically, Shantung is a strategic province. If the Nationalists are to control 
Peking, they must control Shantung. Otherwise the northern capital will he between 
two hostile forces: Japan in Manchuria and the northern war-lords and Japan in Shan-
tung. The railroad from Shanghai to Tientsin and also the disputed railway to Tsingtao 
pass through Tsinanfu, the capital. Here also is situated the great railroad bridge across 
the Yellow River. The force that holds this city can control movements of troops anrl 
supplies north, south and east. 
When the Nationalist Army started north in April of this year, unexpected complica-
tions arose which resulted in serious conAict betw<'en the advancing Chinese and the Jap-
anese troops stationed at Tsinanfu. Early in the disturbance the Chinese wireless station 
was destroyed by the Japanese, with the result that Chinese communications were dis-
organized and the world received the Japanese version through Tokio, Lonrlon. Peking 
and the Shanghai foreign settlement. Later reports, coming from Thomas Millard, the 
Foreign Policy Association, our representative in China, and other dependable and con-
servative sources give a more balanced account. 
On April 30th the Nationalist Army reached Tsinanfu. A force of 3,000 Japanesf• 
soldiers was quartered there. Until May 3rd, everything was peaceful. Then fighting 
broke out for a cause which seems still undeterminedt. The Japanese used armored cars 
and field artillery to clear the settlement. Orders were given on both sides to stop firing, 
but word could not be gotten through to isolated units for some time. Meanwhile, the 
Chinese Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Tsai Kung Tsi, was murdered with 
his staff of ten by the Japanese. On May 5th, everything was quiet, and the main part 
of the army prepared to continue northward, leaving local adjustments to the Foreign 
Ministry. At this time, Chiang Kai-shih sent the followinig circular telegram to hi, 
generals: 
"At the outset of the northern expedition we proclaimed to the peoples of all friendly 
nations that our object was to reach the goal of the revolution, and also at the same 
time announced that wherever our soldiers went they must protect both native and foreign 
li\·es and property. Unexpectedly occupying Tsinanfu caused a misunderstanding between 
the Japanese and ourselves. The military must resume the northern advance and entrust 
the Foreign Ministry to make a settlement with Japan. All should instruct the soldiers 
to protect the. consulates, nationals, and property of friendly powers, and suppress propa-
ganda slogans which are injurious to international friendship. Do not allow your indig-
nation to disrupt these projects." 
On May 7th, after Chiang Kai-shih's departure, the Japanese commander, General 
*Payments on the 40,000,000 yen bond issue whereby the railway was to be redeemed are 
now tw·o yearf.i in arrPars, due to unsettled conditions. 
tThe Japanese claim that thP Chinese soldierR began to loot JapaneHe shops. The Chinese 
official report is that a f'hinese general. Ho Yao-tsu, disobeyed orders and tried · to billet his 
troops in Tsinanfu City. The Japanese tried to disarm his troops before permitting them to come 
out, and shooting ensued. 
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Fukuda, presented a 12-hour ultimaturn to the Chinese officer in command, compnsmg 
the following demands: (1) The Chinese commander responsible for the disorder to he 
severely punishe_d. (2) Troops engaged in the anti-Japanese outbreak to be disarmed. 
(3) All warlike acts against the Japanese to cease. (4) The Xationalist troops to with-
draw to seven miles on either side of the Shantung Railway, and beyond the foreign 
settlement. 
The Chinese commander asked for a 24-hour extension on the ultimatum, for he 
had neither the authority nor sufficient time to accomplish these things, but hi s rcquc>t 
was rejected, and when the time set had elap eel, the Japanese, who in the meantime had 
received a reinforcement of 2,000, set about forcibly to disarm the Chinese. These 
naturally resisted. Finally the Japanese on May 9th began a general bom bardment of 
the city, in the course of which the city wall was destroyed in two places. The Ia t <>f 
the Chinese soldiers were disarmed and clriwn out. After their departure the J apa tw<c 
invited the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to take over the administration of the city 
and public utilities, but three days later they resumed control. The Chinese populatin;, 
have been leaving the city in large numbers since the Japanese occupation. Japanese 
forces numbering 28,000 are to be in Shantung by the end of May, supposedly to protect 
the 17,000 Japanese in Tsinanfu and Tsingtao. The conservative press estimate of 
casualties is 57 Japanese killed and 184 wounded; 2,200 Chinese killed and wounded. 
The immediate results of the Tsinanfu incident are not so important. The Nationalist 
advance was rather badly weakened by it. Japan claims that her only purpose in interfering 
was to protect her nationals at Tsinanfu (about 1,500 in all, the majority of whom arc 
small shopkeepers), and the railroad from Tsingtao. There are about 100 additional 
foreigners in Tsinanfu, 12 of whom are Americans. Foreign opinion in China generally 
approved Japan's alleged purpose, but felt that she had "blundered" in method. The 
spontaneous reaction of all the Japanese papers save one was to condemn the Govern· 
ment's action. Public opinion in England was apprehensive, fearing that Japan might 
have seized this opportunity to retake Shantung. This is the general Chinese belief, too. 
\Vhatever Japan's purpose, she has put herself in a position either to defeat the Nationalist 
campaign or to bring pressure to bear on a victorious Nationalist Government. 
The most serious point brought out by the Tsinanfu incident is the inefficacy of 
international agreements to protect weak nations. The Japanese had no legal right to 
send troops to Tsinanfu. "Both Shanghai and Tientsin have distinct areas under foreign 
control provided for by treaties and therefore the use of foreign military forces to protect 
those areas is legitimate and involves no technical encroachment on China's sovereignty 
or territorial integrity," writes Thomas Millard in the New York Herald-Tribune, May 
15, 1928. "No special foreign residence areas exist anywhere in Shantung, which is purely 
Chinese and under a solely Chinese administration. Japan's action in sending troops to 
Shantung was taken without treaty sanction, and when analyzed was done. to protect 
property. All the powers except Japan advised their nationals to withdraw." 
The difficulty is that the powers are not prepared to dispute Japan's right to do this. 
None of them has been too nice in its interpretation of treaties. Furthermore, curtailment 
of foreign troop movements in China sets an embarrassing precedent. Japan's action 
will probably precipitate a more or Jess successful boycott which will divert that much 
trade to other nations. England wishes to keep on good terms with Japan, as being the 
logical curb to Russia; while the United States has for many years been friendly to 
Japan, and has made rather extensive loans to her. And so, when Ambassador Matsu-
daira informs the State Department that Japan is respecting the Conference agreement 
to observe China's sovereignty, etc .. etc., we agree that this is so. When the Nanking 
Government asks the United States to mediate, we consent on condition that Japan 
will put in a request also, which she will not conceivably do. And when the Nationalist 
Government Council, invoking Article XI of the League Covenant ("Any war or threat 
of war, whether immediately affecting any members of the League or not, is hereby de-
clared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action 
that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the nations."), asks its 
consideration of these matters, the League declares that it is powerless to act until the 
matter shall have been laid before it by a recognized member, that is, by Japan or the 
Peking faction. As matters stand, Japan is slated to make a report on the incident at 
the regular session in June. 
The Tsinanfu incident is a bad example for a nation "bound" by unwelcome treaties. 
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The American Committee for Fair Play in China was 
ganizecl in San Francisco in June, 1925, shortly after 
cl~monstra.tion in Shanghai which resulted in the shooting 
Chinese students by the foregin police. The purpose of 
founders was to create an agency through which 
and timely information concerning China might 
available to the JWOJllt' of this country, with the 
'that out of such work will grow a broader 
umler~tanding between the East and the West, an'l 
guarantee of peace among nations. 
ln pursuance of this aim it has sponsored and a 
it>ctur< s and public meetings, furnished material for 
an<l S!Wnk(•rs. distributed publicity to periodicals, 
lished and llistrbiuted 42,000 r(<ports on various topics 
with phases of the situation in China, and the life of her 
p!e. It has from the beginning been a volunteer mnvenoe:n 
I.Joth in matter of support and of 
of unavoidable cost expenditures. 
A few books on China. in the main new, and vet-y good 
"China. A Xation in Evolution." Paul Monroe. ::11acmlllan 
"In China," by Abel Bannard (awarded the grand 
prize by the French Academy), Dutton; "The China 
Book, 1928." H. G. vi·. VloodhPacl, University of Ch 
Press; "The Youth Movement in China." Tsi C. Wang. 
Repui.Jiic, New York, pu!Jiish~rs; "China, Where It Is 
\Vhy," 'l'homas F. l\1illarcl. Harcourt, Brace and 
"Th~se From the Land of Sinim." Sir Robert Hart, Ch 
ami Hall, London, 1901. 
Please note 
Francisco. 
'rhe China Famine Reli~f is trying to raise 
alleviate the sufferings of the ChinE>se starving in 
It is estimated that 4,000.000 J>eople are facing qt~rvn"''" 
this province, while 6,000,000 others are seriously 
Any he!p will be gratefully rE>ceived at the Relief Headqu 
tPrs. 419 Fourth Avenue, NPw York City. 
'ro those interested in making a closer study 
lean relations, we recommend the following books and 
of which we have made use in preparing this 
Outline History of China," Gowan and Hall; "The 
Policy of the United States," Henry Chung; "Our 
Question," Thomas F. :\Wiard; "Int<>rnational Relations 
the Chinef<e Empire." H. B. Morse; "Official Report of 
"·ashington Conference"; "China Today-Political," S 
K. Hornbeck (World Peace Foundation) ; Report of the 
tratE>rritoriality Commission, State Department Records; 
torial Information Service Reports of the Foreign 
Association; Dispatches of l\1illard to the New York 
Tribune. 
We urge our readers to follow the course of events in China, and to use their influence, locally and 
communication with the State Department, to encourage an independent American policy in China, based on 
effective revision of the unilateral treaties between our two countries. 
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Dear Friend: 
Now that China ' s political future seems a little 
brighter, -V<re want to emphasize in our bull etins other phases of 
her natio"lal life--· socie.l ~ economic ~ and educational--which are 
quite as funda~ental issuez as the political phase , and even mor e 
nec essary to ur..derstand if the i:;:npending treaty refor:::1.s a r e to 
prove really effective . An enlightened foreign policy ca.."l sue-
coed only throug~ the force of enlightened public opinion. 
In order that we may cortinue as a.n educat i onal 
and not I!' ..orely an emergenc:r org£1.'J.i zatioE_. ·we must abandon our old 
pla~1 of f:b.:ancing throuf;h voluntG.ry co:rctributions, which has here-
tofore limited ou.r activity either to t i mes of general prosperity 
or pol itical crisis . We -:,ra::::..t to estabL.sh the American Committee 
on. a J!',e.:J.bm:ship oasis • and en close a card on which \'ie hopo you will ____ _ 
enroll yourself as an active or subscribing member. The dues a r e 
not large . 'Ne believe that our vtork o:1titles us to the considera-
tion of all who hav e r eceived our bulletins. If a reasonA.ble ~r o-
port:..on of them respond , ''re can carry out our schedule of six b 'll-
l ct i ns a year and grow healthily. The need. of a spiritual r o.ppro-
cllement between Jch e East a--,_d t he West is not a sensational issue , 
but it is OLe of t he most fundamental needs of our age , and must 
be mot eventually . lie hope you vvill give our proposal s eriou:"Sand 
synpathetic con sideration. 
Sin cerely yours, 
c:. (.6 ~A L£p. /J LO . /7 L _ V+ • .c...t£..<.L...t::'-<1 
Camilla Chapin D~niels, 
Executive Secretary • 
• 
• Those who contributed $3 . 00 or more towar ds our last budget are 
automatically members . Others who gave less, may beco::1.e !:lembers 
by sending us the dif'fere'lce with the enclosed. c i:rd. Vlhatever 
the response to this l etter, we shall maintain our existence as 
a Conunittee at the above address." But t:1e p'..lblication of further 
bulletins depends Pnti r e ly upon thed~r-ec of support we receive. 
